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ABSTRACT
In evaluating prediction markets (and other crowd-prediction
mechanisms), investigators have repeatedly observed a so-
called wisdom of crowds effect, which can be roughly sum-
marized as follows: the average of participants performs
much better than the average participant. The market price—
an average or at least aggregate of traders’ beliefs—offers a
better estimate than most any individual trader’s opinion.
In this paper, we ask a stronger question: how does the
market price compare to the best trader’s belief, not just
the average trader. We measure the market’s worst-case log
regret, a notion common in machine learning theory. To ar-
rive at a meaningful answer, we need to assume something
about how traders behave. We suppose that every trader
optimizes according to the Kelly criteria, a strategy that
provably maximizes the compound growth of wealth over
an (infinite) sequence of market interactions. We show sev-
eral consequences. First, the market prediction is a wealth-
weighted average of the individual participants’ beliefs. Sec-
ond, the market learns at the optimal rate, the market price
reacts exactly as if updating according to Bayes’ Law, and
the market prediction has low worst-case log regret to the
best individual participant. We simulate a sequence of mar-
kets where an underlying true probability exists, showing
that the market converges to the true objective frequency
as if updating a Beta distribution, as the theory predicts. If
agents adopt a fractional Kelly criteria, a common practical
variant, we show that agents behave like full-Kelly agents
with beliefs weighted between their own and the market’s,
and that the market price converges to a time-discounted
frequency. Our analysis provides a new justification for frac-
tional Kelly betting, a strategy widely used in practice for
ad-hoc reasons. Finally, we propose a method for an agent
to learn her own optimal Kelly fraction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a gamble on a binary event, say, that Obama
will win the 2012 US Presidential election, where every x
dollars risked earns xb dollars in net profit if the gamble
pays off. How many dollars x of your wealth should you risk
if you believe the probability is p? The gamble is favorable
if bp−(1−p) > 0, in which case betting your entire wealth w
will maximize your expected profit. However, that’s extraor-
dinarily risky: a single stroke of bad luck loses everything.
Over the course of many such gambles, the probability of
bankruptcy approaches 1. On the other hand, betting a
small fixed amount avoids bankruptcy but cannot take ad-
vantage of compounding growth.
The Kelly criteria prescribes choosing x to maximize the
expected compounding growth rate of wealth, or equiva-
lently to maximize the expected logarithm of wealth. Kelly
betting is asymptotically optimal, meaning that in the limit
over many gambles, a Kelly bettor will grow wealthier than
an otherwise identical non-Kelly bettor with probability 1
[1, 3, 7, 16, 17].
Assume all agents in a market optimize according to the
Kelly principle, where b is selected to clear the market. We
consider the implications for the market as a whole and
properties of the market odds b or, equivalently, the mar-
ket probability pm = 1/(1 + b). We show that the market
prediction pm is a wealth-weighted average of the agents’
predictions pi. Over time, the market itself—by reallocat-
ing wealth among participants—adapts at the optimal rate
with bounded log regret to the best individual agent. When
a true objective probability exists, the market converges to
it as if properly updating a Beta distribution according to
Bayes’ rule. These results illustrate that there is no “price
of anarchy” associated with well-run prediction markets.
We also consider fractional Kelly betting, a lower-risk vari-
ant of Kelly betting that is popular in practice but has less
theoretical grounding. We provide a new justification for
fractional Kelly based on agent’s confidence. In this case,
the market prediction is a confidence-and-wealth-weighted
average that empirically converges to a time-discounted ver-
sion of objective frequency. Finally, we propose a method
for agents to learn their optimal fraction over time.
2. KELLY BETTING
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When offered b-to-1 odds on an event with probability p,
the Kelly-optimal amount to bet is f∗w, where
f∗ =
bp− (1− p)
b
is the optimal fixed fraction of total wealth w to commit to
the gamble.
If f∗ is negative, Kelly says to avoid betting: expected
profit is negative. If f∗ is positive, you have an information
edge; Kelly says to invest a fraction of your wealth propor-
tional to how advantageous the bet is. In addition to max-
imizing the growth rate of wealth, Kelly betting maximizes
the geometric mean of wealth and asymptotically minimizes
the mean time to reach a given aspiration level of wealth
[17].
Suppose fair odds of 1/b are simultaneously offered on the
opposite outcome (e.g., Obama will not win the election). If
bp − (1 − p) < 0, then betting on this opposite outcome is
favorable; substituting 1/b for b and 1− p for p, the optimal
fraction of wealth to bet becomes 1− p− bp.
An equivalent way to think of a gamble with odds b is as
a prediction market with price pm = 1/(1 + b). The volume
of bet is specified by choosing a quantity q of shares, where
each share is worth $1 if the outcome occurs and nothing
otherwise. The price represents the cost of one share: the
amount needed to pay for a chance to win back $1. In this
interpretation, the Kelly formula becomes
f∗ =
p− pm
1− pm .
The optimal action for the agent is to trade q∗ = f∗w/pm
shares, where q∗ > 0 is a buy order and q∗ < 0 is a sell
order, or a bet against the outcome.
Note that q∗ is the optimum of expected log utility
p ln((1− pm)q + w) + (1− p) ln(−pmq + w).
This is not a coincidence: Kelly betting is identical to max-
imizing expected log utility.
3. MARKET MODEL
Suppose that we have a prediction market, where partic-
ipant i has a starting wealth wi with
∑
i wi = 1. Each
participant i uses Kelly betting to determine the fraction f∗i
of their wealth bet, depending on their predicted probability
pi.
We model the market as an auctioneer matching sup-
ply and demand, taking no profit and absorbing no loss.
We adopt a competitive equilibrium concept, meaning that
agents are ”price takers”, or do not consider their own effect
on prices if any. Agents optimize according to the current
price and do not reason further about what the price might
reveal about the other agents’ information. An exception
of sorts is the fractional Kelly setting, where agents do con-
sider the market price as information and weigh it along
with their own.
A market is in competitive equilibrium at price pm if all
agents are optimizing and
∑
i q
∗
i = 0, or every buy order
and sell order are matched. We discuss next what the value
of pm is.
4. MARKET PREDICTION
In order to define the prediction market’s performance,
we must define its prediction b, or the equilibrium payoff
odds reached when all agents are optimizing, and supply
and demand are precisely balanced. Recall that the market’s
probability implied by the odds of b is pm = 1/(1 + b). We
will show that pm is
∑
i wipi.
4.1 Payout balance
The first approach we’ll use is payout balance: the amount
of money at risk must be the same as the amount paid out.
Theorem 1. (Market Pricing) For all normalized agent
wealths wi and agent beliefs pi,
pm =
∑
i
piwi
Proof. To see this, recall that f∗i = (pi − pm)/(1 − pm) for
pi > pm. For pi < pm, Kelly betting prescribes taking the
other side of the bet, with fraction
(1− pi)− (1− pm)
1− (1− pm) =
pm − pi
pm
.
So the market equilibrium occurs at the point pm where the
payout is equal to the payin. If the event occurs, the payin
is
(1 + b)
∑
i:pi>pm
pi − pm
1− pm wi =
1
pm
∑
i:pi>pm
pi − pm
1− pm wi.
Thus we want
1
pm
∑
i:pi>pm
pi − pm
1− pm wi =
∑
i:pi>pm
pi − pm
1− pm wi +∑
i:pi<pm
pm − pi
pm
wi, or
1− pm
pm
∑
i:pi>pm
pi − pm
1− pm wi =
∑
i:pi<pm
pm − pi
pm
wi, or∑
i:pi>pm
(pi − pm)wi =
∑
i:pi<pm
(pm − pi)wi, or∑
i
piwi =
∑
i
pmwi.
Using
∑
i wi = 1, we get the theorem.
4.2 Log utility maximization
An alternate derivation of the market prediction utilizes
the fact that Kelly betting is equivalent to maximizing ex-
pected log utility. Let q = x(b+ 1) be the gross profit of an
agent who risks x dollars, or in prediction market language
the number of shares purchased. Then expected log utility
is
E[U(q)] = p ln((1− pm)q + w) + (1− p) ln(−pmq + w).
The optimal q that maximizes E[U(q)] is
q(pm) =
w
pm
· p− pm
1− pm . (1)
Proposition 2. In a market of agents each with log utility
and initial wealth w, the competitive equilibrium price is
pm =
∑
i
wipi (2)
where we assume
∑
i wi = 1, or w is normalized wealth not
absolute wealth.
Proof. These prices satisfy
∑
i qi = 0, the condition for
competitive equilibrium (supply equals demand), by substi-
tution. 2
This result can be seen as a simplified derivation of that
by Rubinstein [13, 14, 15] and is also discussed by Pennock
and Wellman [11, 10] and Wolfers and Zitzewitz [18].
5. LEARNING PREDICTION MARKETS
Individual participants may have varying prediction qual-
ities and individual markets may have varying odds of pay-
off. What happens to the wealth distribution and hence the
quality of the market prediction over time? We show next
that the market learns optimally for two well understood
senses of optimal.
5.1 Wealth redistributed according to Bayes’
Law
In an individual round, if an agent’s belief is pi > pm,
then they bet pi−pm
1−pm wi and have a total wealth afterward
dependent on y according to:
If y = 1,
(
1
pm
− 1
)
pi − pm
1− pm wi + wi =
pi
pm
wi
If y = 0, (−1)pi − pm
1− pm wi + wi =
1− pi
1− pmwi
Similarly if pi < pm, we get:
If y = 1, (−1)pm − pi
pm
wi + wi =
pi
pm
wi
If y = 0,
(
1
1− pm − 1
)
pm − pi
pm
wi + wi =
1− pi
1− pmwi,
which is identical.
If we treat the prior probability that agent i is correct
as wi, Bayes’ law states that the posterior probability of
choosing agent i is
P (i | y = 1) = P (y = 1 | i)P (i)
P (y = 1)
=
piwi
pm
=
piwi∑
i piwi
,
which is precisely the wealth computed above for the y = 1
outcome. The same holds when y = 0, and so Kelly bettors
redistribute wealth according to Bayes’ law.
5.2 Market Sequences
It is well known that Bayes’ law is the correct approach for
integrating evidence into a belief distribution, which shows
that Kelly betting agents optimally summarize all past in-
formation if the true behavior of the world was drawn from
the prior distribution of wealth.
Often these assumptions are too strong—the world does
not behave according to the prior on wealth, and it may act
in a manner completely different from any one single expert.
In that case, a standard analysis from learning theory shows
that the market has low regret, performing almost as well as
the best market participant.
For any particular sequence of markets we have a sequence
pt of market predictions and yt ∈ {0, 1} of market outcomes.
We measure the accuracy of a market according to log loss
as
L ≡
T∑
t=1
I(yt = 1) log
1
pt
+ I(yt = 0) log
1
1− pt .
Similarly, we measure the quality of market participant mak-
ing prediction pit as
Li ≡
T∑
t=1
I(yt = 1) log
1
pit
+ I(yt = 0) log
1
1− pit .
So after T rounds, the total wealth of player i is
wi
T∏
t=1
(
pit
pt
)yt (1− pit
1− pt
)1−yt
,
where wi is the starting wealth. We next prove a well-known
theorem for learning in the present context (see for exam-
ple [4]).
Theorem 3. For all sequences of participant predictions pit
and all sequences of revealed outcomes yt,
L ≤ min
i
Li + ln
1
wi
.
This theorem is extraordinarily general, as it applies to all
market participants and all outcome sequences, even when
these are chosen adversarially. It states that even in this
worst-case situation, the market performs only ln 1/wi worse
than the best market participant i.
Proof. Initially, we have that
∑
i wi = 1. After T rounds,
the total wealth of any participant i is given by
wi
T∏
t=1
(
pit
pt
)yt (1− pit
1− pt
)1−yt
= wie
L−Li ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows from wealth being con-
served. Thus lnwi + L− Li ≤ 0, yielding
L ≤ Li + ln 1
wi
.
6. FRACTIONAL KELLY BETTING
Fractional Kelly betting says to invest a smaller fraction
λf∗ of wealth for λ < 1. Fractional Kelly is usually justified
on an ad-hoc basis as either (1) a risk-reduction strategy,
since practitioners often view full Kelly as too volatile, or
(2) a way to protect against an inaccurate belief p, or both
[17]. Here we derive an alternate interpretation of fractional
Kelly. In prediction market terms, the fractional Kelly for-
mula is
λ
p− pm
1− pm .
With some algebra, fractional Kelly can be rewritten as
p′ − pm
1− pm
where
p′ = λp+ (1− λ)pm. (3)
In other words, λ-fractional Kelly is precisely equivalent to
full Kelly with revised belief λp+(1−λ)pm, or a weighted av-
erage of the agent’s original belief and the market’s belief. In
this light, fractional Kelly is a form of confidence weighting
where the agent mixes between remaining steadfast with its
own belief (λ = 1) and acceding to the crowd and taking the
market price as the true probability (λ = 0). The weighted
average form has a Bayesian justification if the agent has a
Beta prior over p and has seen t independent Bernoulli trials
to arrive at its current belief. If the agent envisions that the
market has seen t′ trials, then she will update her belief to
λp+ (1− λ)pm, where λ = t/(t+ t′) [9, 10, 12]. The agent’s
posterior probability given the price is a weighted average of
its prior and the price, where the weighting term captures
her perception of her own confidence, expressed in terms of
the independent observation count seen as compared to the
market.
7. MARKETPREDICTIONWITHFRACTIONAL
KELLY
When agents play fractional Kelly, the competitive equi-
librium price naturally changes. The resulting market price
is easily compute, as for fully Kelly agents.
Theorem 4. (Fractional Kelly Market Pricing) For all agent
beliefs pi, normalized wealths wi and fractions λi
pm =
∑
i λiwipi∑
l λlwl
. (4)
Prices retain the form of a weighted average, but with
weights proportional to the product of wealth and self-assessed
confidence.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 1.
In particular, we note that a λ-fractional Kelly agent of
wealth w bets precisely as a full-Kelly agent of wealth λw.
Consequently, we can apply theorem 1 with w′i =
λiwi∑
i λiwi
and p′i = pi unchanged.
8. MARKET DYNAMICS WITH STATION-
ARY OBJECTIVE FREQUENCY
The worst-case bounds above hold even if event outcomes
are chosen by a malicious adversary. In this section, we
examine how the market performs when the objective fre-
quency of outcomes is unknown though stationary.
The market consists of a single bet repeated over the
course of T periods. Unbeknown to the agents, each event
unfolds as an independent Bernoulli trial with probability of
success pi. At the beginning of time period t, the realization
of event Et is unknown and agents trade until equilibrium.
Then the outcome is revealed, and the agents’ holdings pay
off accordingly. As time period t+ 1 begins, the outcome of
Et+1 is uncertain. Agents bet on the t+1 period event until
equilibrium, the outcome is revealed, payoffs are collected,
and the process repeats.
In an economy of Kelly bettors, the equilibrium price is
a wealth-weighted average (2). Thus, as an agent accrues
relatively more earnings than the others, its influence on
price increases. In the next two subsections, we examine how
this adaptive process unfolds; first, with full-Kelly agents
and second, with fractional Kelly agents. In the former case,
prices react exactly as if the market were a single agent
updating a Beta distribution according to Bayes’ rule.
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Figure 1: (a) Price (black line) versus the observed
frequency (gray line) of the event over 150 time pe-
riods. The market consists of 100 full-Kelly agents
with initial wealth wi = 1/100. (b) Wealth after
15 time periods versus belief for 100 Kelly agents.
The event has occurred in 10 of the 15 trials. The
solid line is the posterior Beta distribution consis-
tent with observing 10 successes in 15 independent
Bernoulli trials.
8.1 Market dynamics with full-Kelly agents
Figure 1.a plots the price over 150 time periods, in a
market composed of 100 Kelly agents with initial wealth
wi = 1/100, and pi generated randomly and uniformly on
(0, 1). In this simulation the true probability of success pi
is 0.5. For comparison, the figure also shows the observed
frequency, or the number of times that E has occurred di-
vided by the number of periods. The market price tracks
the observed frequency extremely closely. Note that price
changes are due entirely to a transfer of wealth from inaccu-
rate agents to accurate agents, who then wield more power
in the market; individual beliefs remain fixed.
Figure 1.b illustrates the nature of this wealth transfer.
The graph provides a snapshot of agents’ wealth versus their
belief pi after period 15. In this run, E has occurred in 10
out of the 15 trials. The maximum in wealth is near 10/15 or
2/3. The solid line in the figure is a Beta distribution with
parameters 10 + 1 and 5 + 1. This distribution is precisely
the posterior probability of success that results from the
observation of 10 successes out of 15 independent Bernoulli
trials, when the prior probability of success is uniform on
(0,1). The fit is essentially perfect, and can be proved in the
limit since the Beta distribution is conjugate to the Binomial
distribution under Bayes’ Law.
Although individual agents are not adaptive, the mar-
ket’s composite agent computes a proper Bayesian update.
Specifically, wealth is reallocated proportionally to a Beta
distribution corresponding to the observed number of suc-
cesses and trials, and price is approximately the expected
value of this Beta distribution.1 Moreover, this correspon-
dence holds regardless of the number of successes or failures,
or the temporal order of their occurrence. A kind of collec-
tive Bayesianity emerges from the interactions of the group.
We also find empirically that, even if not all agents are
Kelly bettors, among those that are, wealth is still redis-
tributed according to Bayes’ rule.
8.2 Market dynamics with fractional Kelly agents
In this section, we consider fractional Kelly agents who,
as we saw in Section 2, behave like full Kelly agents with
belief λp + (1 − λ)pm. Figure 2.a graphs the dynamics of
price in an economy of 100 such agents, along with the ob-
served frequency. Over time, the price remains significantly
more volatile than the frequency, which converges toward
pi = 0.5. Below, we characterize the transfer of wealth that
precipitates this added volatility; for now concentrate on the
price signal itself. Inspecting Figure 2.a, price changes still
exhibit a marked dependence on event outcomes, though at
any given period the effect of recent history appears magni-
fied, and the past discounted, as compared with the observed
frequency. Working from this intuition, we attempt to fit
the data to an appropriately modified measure of frequency.
Define the discounted frequency at period n as
dn =
∑n
t=1 γ
n−t(1E(t))∑n
t=1 γ
n−t(1E(t)) +
∑n
t=1 γ
n−t(1E(t))
, (5)
where 1E(t) is the indicator function for the event at period
t, and γ is the discount factor. Note that γ = 1 recovers the
standard observed frequency.
1As t grows, this expected value rapidly approaches the ob-
served frequency plotted in Figure 1.
(a) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2: (a) Price (black line) versus observed fre-
quency (gray line) over 150 time periods for 100
agents with Kelly fraction λ = 0.2. As the frequency
converges to pi = 0.5, the price remains volatile. (b)
Price (black line) versus discounted frequency (gray
line), with discount factor γ = 0.96, for the same
experiment as (a).
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Figure 3: (a) Wealth wi versus belief pi at period 150
of the same experiment as Figure 2 with 100 agents
with Kelly fraction λ = 0.2. The observed frequency
is 69/150 and the solid line is Beta(69 + 1, 81 + 1).
The wealth distribution is significantly more evenly
dispersed than the corresponding Beta distribution.
Figure 2.b illustrates a very close correlation between dis-
counted frequency, with γ = 0.96 (hand tuned), and the
same price curve of Figure 2.a. While standard frequency
provides a provably good model of price dynamics in an
economy of full-Kelly agents, discounted frequency (5) ap-
pears a better model for fractional Kelly agents.
To explain the close fit to discounted frequency, one might
expect that wealth remains dispersed—as if the market’s
composite agent witnesses fewer trials than actually occur.
That’s true to an extent. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
wealth after 69 successes have occurred in 150 trials. Wealth
is significantly more evenly distributed than a Beta distribu-
tion with parameters 69+1 and 81+1, also shown. However,
the stretched distribution can’t be modeled precisely as an-
other, less-informed Beta distribution.
9. LEARNING THE KELLY FRACTION
In theory, a rational agent playing against rational oppo-
nents should set their Kelly fraction to λ = 0, since, in a
rational expectations equilibrium [6], the market price is by
definition at least as informative as any agent’s belief. This
is the crux of the no-trade theorems [8]. Despite the theory
[5], people do agree to disagree in practice and, simply put,
trade happens. Still, placing substantial weight on the mar-
ket price is often prudent. For example, in an online predic-
tion contest called ProbabilitySports, 99.7% of participants
were outperformed by the unweighted average predictor, a
typical result.2
In this light, fractional Kelly can be seen as an experts
algorithm [2] with two experts: yourself and the market.
We propose dynamically updating λ according to standard
experts algorithm logic: When you’re right, you increase
λ appropriately; when you’re wrong, you decrease λ. This
gives a long-term procedure for updating λ that guarantees:
• You won’t do too much worse than the market (which
by definition earns 0)
• You won’t do too much worse than Kelly betting using
your original prior p
2
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/02/how_and_when_to.html
For example, if you allocate an initial weight of 0.5 to your
predictions and 0.5 to the market’s prediction, then the re-
gret guarantee of section 5.2 implies that at most half of all
wealth is lost.
10. DISCUSSION
We’ve shown something intuitively appealing here: self-
interested agents with log wealth utility create markets which
learn to have small regret according to log loss. There are
two distinct “log”s in this statement, and it’s appealing to
consider what happens when we vary these. When agents
have some utility other than log wealth utility, can we alter
the structure of a market so that the market dynamics make
the market price have low log loss regret? And similarly if
we care about some other loss—such as squared loss, 0/1
loss, or a quantile loss, can we craft a marketplace such that
log wealth utility agents achieve small regret with respect to
these other losses?
What happens in a market without Kelly bettors? This
can’t be described in general, although a couple special cases
are relevant. When all agents have constant absolute risk
aversion, the market computes a weighted geometric aver-
age of beliefs [10, 11, 13]. When one of the bettors acts
according to Kelly and the others in some more irrational
fashion. In this case, the basic Kelly guarantee implies that
the Kelly bettor will come to dominate non-Kelly bettors
with equivalent or worse log loss. If non-Kelly agents have
a better log loss, the behavior can vary, possibly imposing
greater regret on the marketplace if the Kelly bettor accrues
the wealth despite a worse prediction record. For this rea-
son, it may be desirable to make Kelly betting an explicit
option in prediction markets.
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